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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 393 
FEDERAL CoURTS-JurusD1cnoN-D1sTRicr COURT TRANSFER OF AcnoN 
UNDER SECI'ION 1406(a) WITHOUT JURISDicrION OVER PERSON OF DEFENDANT 
-In 1956 plaintiff corporation brought a private antitrust action against 
various persons and corporations in a federal district court in Pennsylvania. 
Service was made upon defendant corporations by means of alias sum-
monses1 in New York where they were amenable to suit. Since defendant 
corporations were not inhabitants of, "found," or transacting business in 
Pennsylvania, venue was improper there and the extraterritorial service-
of-process provision of the Clayton Act2 was not available to plaintiff. 
Defendant corporations moved to dismiss for lack of in personam juris-
diction. Instead, however, the court, invoking section I406(a) of the Ju-
dicial Code,8 transferred the action in 1958 to a federal district court in 
New York.4 The latter court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on 
the ground that the transfer was unauthorized because the Pennsylvania 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants.I• The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, with one judge dis-
senting.8 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, reversed, two Justices 
dissenting. When it is "in the interest of justice," section 1406(a) author-
izes the transfer of cases whether the transferor court has personal juris-
diction over the defendants or not. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 468 
(1962). 
1 A mmmons used to commence an action where the original writ has failed to 
effect its purpose because of a defect in fonn or manner of service, and when issued, it 
mpenedes the original writ. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 108 Mont. 246, 89 P.2d 1020 (19!19); 
Manmr v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Mo. App. 726, 118 S.W. 1198 (1909); McGuire 
v. Montvale Lumber Co., 190 N.C. 806, 181 S.E. 274 (1925). Apparently, in the instant 
action, the original writ was defective as to the parties defendant; thus a second writ was 
neceasary. 
2 !18 Stat. 786 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). This section, which deals with both 
venue and personal jurisdiction in antitrust actions against corporations, provides that 
suit may be brought :in the judicial district where the defendant is an inhabitant, may 
be found, or transacts business, and that all process may be served where defendant 
is an inhabitant or wherever it may be found. 
a 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1958). 
' 169 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1958). 
II Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 175 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
8 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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Until 1948, a federal district court was compelled to dismiss any action 
whenever a timely objection was made to improperly laid venue.7 This 
procedure was completely reversed in 1948 by the enactment of section 
1406(a) which provided that an action brought where venue was improper 
"shall" be transferred to another forum in which it could have been 
brought.8 To protect against potential abuse9 from such a radical change1° 
in the law, Congress amended the section in 1949 to provide that such 
actions may be either transferred or dismissed "in the interest of justice."11 
At first, the main issue litigated under section 1406(a) and its companion 
transfer provision, section 1404(a),12 was the construction of the phrase 
"where it might have been brought."13 Recently, the Supreme Court 
resolved the conflict among the circuits by holding that the place where 
an action might have been brought does not depend on the wish or 
waiver of the defendant, but rather on whether the transferee district was 
one in which the action might originally have been brought by plaintiff.H 
However, as soon as this issue was settled another equally perplexing 
7 See Suttle v. Reich Bros., 333 U.S. 163 (1948); Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 316 
(1919); Riley v. Union Pac. R.R., 177 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1949) (dictim), cert. denied, 
338 U.S. 911 (1950); Schoen v. Mountain Producer Corp., 170 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 
1948); Kibler v. Transcontinental 8e W. Air Co., 63 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); 
Brown v. Heinen, 61 F. Supp. 563 (D. Minn. 1945); Billings Util. Co. v. Federal Reserve 
Bank, 40 F. Supp. 309, 311 (D. Mont. 1941); HART 8e WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 950 (1953); 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,I 0.146[2], at 1904 
(2d ed. 1960). 
8 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1958). See generally Stamatiou v. Miller, 88 F. Supp. 556 
(E.D. Pa. 1949). 
9 H.R. REP. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949); S. REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. 4 (1949). 
10 See HART 8e WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 951; 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra 
note 7, ,I 0.146[4], at 1905; MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 195 (1949). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1958) reads: "The district court of a district in which is filed 
a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the 
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have 
been brought." 
12 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958) reads: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought." 
13 The majority of courts held that it was improper to transfer on plaintiff's mo-
tion to a forum in which defendant would not be amenable to process or in which 
venue was lacking. See, e.g., Blackmar v. Guerre, 190 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1951), aff'd 
on other grounds, 342 U.S. 512 (1952); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d 
Cir. 1950); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950). However, since 
personal jurisdiction and venue requirements exist for the benefit of the defendant, and 
may be waived, it was held by several courts that upon defendant's express consent 
the action could be transferred from a court of proper jurisdiction and venue to a 
forum that otherwise lacked either or both of these requirements. E.g., Paramount 
Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951); 
Anthony v. RKO Radio Pictures, 103 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
14 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960). Actually, this case dealt with 
§ 1404(a), which is ostensibly a codification of the judicial doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. But the language is quite similar to § 1406(a), the former allowing transfer 
when venue is correct, the latter when it is not. Thus for all purposes the language 
"might have been brought" is equally affected by the Hoffman decision. 
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jurisdictional question involving 1406(a) came before the Court. In the 
principal case, the essential problem presented was whether a federal 
court, lacking jurisdiction over a defendant, may nevertheless transfer the 
action to a district where service could be effected. The majority,15 per 
Mr. Justice Black, agreed with plaintiff that the decisions below requiring 
personal jurisdiction before transfer read into 1406(a) an unnecessary re-
striction which was neither expressed in the language of the statute nor 
justified by its legislative history.16 The Court stated that the primary 
purpose of 1406(a) was to avoid the injustice to plaintiff in losing his 
cause of action under a statute of limitations merely because he had, in 
good faith, made an erroneous guess with regard to some elusive and un-
certain fact upon which venue and personal jurisdiction happened to 
turn. The Court felt that the phrase "in the interest of justice" was 
amply broad to authorize the transfer of cases regardless of how wrong 
the plaintiff may have been as to venue and personal jurisdiction, as long 
as the transferor court feels that plaintiff has made an honest mistake. 
The Court maintained that such a construction was in accord with the 
current procedural philosophy of removing whatever obstacles may im-
pede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies 
on the merits. This, the majority opinion concluded, would protect plain-
tiff from being penalized by "time-consuming and justice-defeating tech-
nicalities."17 
In complete sympathy with this general objective, the dissent, per Mr. 
Justice Harlan, nevertheless felt that the situation was one to be remedied 
by legislative,18 not judicial, means. In a brief opinion, the dissent em-
phasized both the lack of legislative history and prior case law supporting 
the novel theory that a court may affect a defendant's substantive rights 
without first having personal jurisdiction. 
Although personal jurisdiction is generally held to be necessary for 
a court to render a valid judgment against a defendant, this requirement 
may be waived19 or, in some instances, dispensed with whenever it is 
necessary to prevent irreparable injury.20 In antitrust and other complex 
llS This was a five-two decision with newly-appointed Mr. Justice White and ailing 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter not taking part. 
16 Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 5-6, Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962). 
See S. REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949), for the legislative history. 
17 The late Judge Parker speaking in Intematio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 
F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1955). 
18 The dissent preferred to have the Judicial Conference of the United States ex-
press its views on the subject before any congressional action was taken. Cf. Miner v. 
Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650-52 (1960). 
19 See, e.g., Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. 
denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951); Fleming v. Black Warrior Copper Co., 15 Ariz. 1, 136 Pac. 
273 (1913); Ferguson v. Oliver, 99 Mich. 161, 58 N.W. 43 (1894). The theory is that 
it is a mere privilege of the defendant to insist that he be personally served within the 
jurisdiction of the court and that he may readily consent to personal jurisdiction without 
observing the usual legal formalities. Springer v. Shavender, 118 N.C. 23, 23 S.E. 976 
(1895). 
20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) which was taken from Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 
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and expensive actions against multiple corporate defendants, it is quite 
possible that a plaintiff may make a bona fide mistake in believing that 
certain contacts are sufficient to support both venue and jurisdiction. In 
fact, such a question may be so extensively litigated that all applicable 
statutes of limitations are exhausted and any further action by plaintiff 
is barred. Fearing this result because of the short statute of limitations 
in certain admiralty actions, the court in lnternatio-Rotterdam v. Thom-
sen,21 the chief precedent relied upon by the majority in the principal 
case, made the plaintiff's good faith rather than the transferor court's 
acquisition of personal jurisdiction the controlling consideration in trans-
ferring an action brought in a place where venue was improperly laid. In 
building upon and extending these principles, the principal case has made 
"in the interest of justice" a good faith standard that will expedite the 
orderly administration of justice in the federal system by preventing pro-
cedural snarls which sometimes may result in the destruction of substan-
tive rights. Since a defendant will still have to be properly served in the 
transferee district before his substantive rights can be affected and since 
the courts still have the discretionary prerogative to refuse transfer, no 
abuse should result from this liberal construction of 1406(a). Moreover, 
it is hoped and expected that the courts will quickly extend the philosophy 
of the principal case to 1404(a), thus allowing these transfer-of-venue stat-
utes to be realized to their full potential in permitting a plaintiff, in good 
faith, to bring an action in any federal court and thereby toll the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
J. Patrick Martin, S.Ed. 
§ 17, !18 Stat. 7!17, allowing temporary restraining orders to be granted without notice 
to the adverse party when the specific facts show that irreparable damage will occur 
before notice could be served and a hearing had thereon. For judicial origin of this 
doctrine, see Irwin v. Dixson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10, 28-29 (1850); Georgia v. Brailsford, 
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792). 
21 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1955). Although this case was an admiralty action, its 
principles would seem to apply to all civil actions, since the basic theory involved is 
avoiding the sacrifice of the spirit of the law for its letter, often encrusted with pro• 
cedural technicalities of a former era. See also Amerio Contact Plate Freezers, Inc. v. 
Knowles, 274 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Schiller v. Mit-Clip Co., 180 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 
1950); Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Stone, 116 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 195!1); 1 MOORE, 
op. dt. supra. note 7, 1[ 0.146[5], at 1910. 
